5-6. szám --[ címlap | impresszum | keresés | mutató | tartalom ]

Mese habbal -- a referencia kifürkészhetetlenségének problémájáról

Focusing on the inscrutability of reference, this paper takes into consideration problems within Fields and Davidsons critisism of Quines theory. The simplest way of modeling the inscrutability of reference as a permutation of the universe is to map each object to another. By preserving the techniques and treatments of formalization in quantification theory, Quine simply reinterprets the original system of signs. The variables, as means of reification, remain unchanged, and he suggests the relativity of reference as the solution of the problem of translation. Because reference can not be relative, and nonrelative reference must be based on a decision that can not be evidentially supported, but arbitrary, according to Field, Quine himself has become a victim of the myth of the museum. Within Davidsons radically different arguments, Quines idea of reference relative to a background language is unintelligible, for the ontology can not be fixed by choice between translation manuals. We can find a whole chain of criticism in these proposed answers to the question of interpretation: the intention of determining the reference solely guides Field, however Davidsons argument for the inscrutability of reference seems to be stronger if we admit that a satisfying theory has to provide an acceptable explanation of verbal behaviour and dispositions. By addressing a question to Davidson, I try to add a new link to the chain. Why must it be so important to decide, in any way, between schemes of refrence if it previously poved true that they, as cases of the inscrutability of reference shows, yield equally true and intelligible sentences?

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